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SITUS OF INTANGIBLES IN SUITS AGAINST
NONRESIDENT CLAIMANTS
By FLETCHER R. ANDREWS t
EXERCISE by a court of jurisdiction in rem or quasi in rem" is valid
only if the property or res involved be within the territorial boundaries
over which the court holds sway.2 If the subject matter of the action
is real property or tangible personal property, it is comparatively simple
to determine whether the res is within those boundaries. But when in-
tangible property is involved, the problem becomes far more complex.
Realistically, an intangible has no situs in the sense that tangible property
has, and it is necessary, therefore, to act somewhat arbitrarily in assigning
it one.' The purpose of this Article is to investigate this difficult problem
and to discover, if possible, what forms of intangibles are regarded as
property for the purpose of jurisdiction i rem, and what is the situs
of each. The field of inquiry will be limited to suits involving a dispute
with reference to the ownership of or some interest in the intangible in
question,4 and will not include the attachment cases, except where refer-
ence to them may be helpful to a determination of the issue. In the interest
of clarity, the various kinds of intangibles will be separately considered.
Bonds
A bond evidences an obligation. Conceivably, a court might hold that
it is nothing more than the evidence of that obligation and consequently
that the location of the bond is immaterial in determining the situs of the
* Professor of Law, Western Reserve University Law School.
1. For a discussion of actions in rem as opposed to actions in personam, see Coo!:,
The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the Conflict of Lows (1931) 31 Cot. L RLv.
368; Cook, The Powers of Courts in Equity (1915) 15 COL L. REv. 37, 46-47. For the
line of demarcation between actions in rem and quasi in ren, see Beale, The Exercise
of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913) 27 I-Ltnv. L REV. 107, 109;
Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 Co. L. RE% 37, 47. For the salze of
simplicity the term in rem will be used to include actions quasi in rem vhere applicable.
2. The authorities upon this proposition are legion. See, for example, Baker v.
Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917). The Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution permits constructive service upon nonresident defendants in actions in rcm. Arndt
v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (1890); Roller v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900). Many other
decisions might be cited in support of this statement.
3. See GooDRIc H, CoNrFLCT Or LAws (2d ed. 1938) 141; (1932) 32 Co. L. Rv.
1441.
4. It is important to note that the situs of a given type of intangible may differ vith
the type of case involved. For instance, the situs of a debt is said to be at the domicil of
the creditor for purposes of taxation, but at the domicil of the debtor for purposes of
garnishment. See 1 BFA F, CoNrLicr OF LAws (1935) 301-302. The type of action which
is here the subject of inquiry will sometimes be referred to as the "conflicting claimant"
case.
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debt. In that event, if a debt evidenced by a bond is to be considered
property in connection with jurisdiction in rem, some other basis for situs
must be found. This might be the domicil of the holder, the domicil of
the obligor, or any place where the obligor is found. On the other hand,
a court might regard the bond as property in itself, having a situs wher-
ever located. Under this view the other enumerated elements would be
of no importance.
Although under certain circumstances courts have not hesitated to hold
that a debt is a res having its situs at the domicil of the obligor,, this
is not the law in the situation with which this study deals.' Accordingly,
if domicil of the obligor does not suffice to give a situs for jurisdiction
in rein, it naturally follows that no situs exists by reason of the obligor's
presence.7
There is left, then, a choice between the domicil of the holder and the
place where the bonds are located. Either of the following fact situations
should help materially in the solution of the problem.
1. The bonds are present, but the holder is a nonresident. The as-
sumption of jurisdiction under such circumstances would establish a
situs at the location of the bonds, although it would not necessarily pre-
clude an alternative situs at the holder's domicil. On the other hand,
refusal to take jurisdiction because of the nonresidence of the holder
would establish the holder's domicil as the situs, to the exclusion of the
locale of the bonds.
8
5. See 1 BEALE, loc. cit. supra note 4 (garnishment) ; Wyman v. Halstead, 109
U. S. 654, 656 (administration).
6. In the following cases the court took jurisdiction without reference to the oblig-
or's domicil: Bede Steam Shipping Co. v. New York Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 658 (S. D.
N. Y. 1931); First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 468, 246 N. W. 1
(1932) ; Laughlin v. Wells Bldg. Co., 169 Wis. 50, 171 N. W. 755 (1919). In the fol-
lowing cases the court refused jurisdiction without reference thereto: Chase v. Wetzlar,
225 U. S. 79 (1912); McLaughlin v. McLaughlin Real Estate Co., 162 App. Div. 644,
147 N. Y. Supp. 959 (2d Dep't 1914); Hodgens v. Columbia Trust Co., 185 App. Div,
555, 173 N. Y. Supp. 304 (1st Dep't 1918) ; Cleveland National Bank v. Burroughs Land
Co., 10 Ohio App. 61 (1917) ; Gallagher v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 315, 185 At. 707 (1936).
In the absence of other factors, courts have refused to take jurisdiction in ren at
the obligor's domicil. Vaverly v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 100 Ill. 354 (1881) ; Wil-
liams v. Fischlein, 144 App. Div. 244, 129 N. Y. Supp. 129 (2d Dep't 1911). Although
it is true that in the former case the defendants were "the unknown owners" of the
bonds, the court based its decision upon the fact that neither the bonds nor the owners
were within the court's jurisdiction. Where the obligor's domicil and the bonds were
outside the state, jurisdiction has been refused without giving weight to the former fac-
tor. Gilmore v. Robillard, 44 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930); Von Hesse v. Mackaye,
55 Hun 365, 8 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1st Dep't 1890) ; Huntzinger and Cake v. Philadelphia
Coal Co., 11 Phila. 609 (Pa. C. P. 1876).
7. Von Hesse v. Mackaye, 55 Hun 365, 8 N. Y. Supp. 894 (Ist Dep't 1890). No
case has been found suggesting any such basis for situs. A holding to that effect by the
court below in the Von Hesse case was reversed by the Appellate Division.
8. No cases have been found, however, with such simple fact situations.
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2. The action is brought at the holder's domicil, but the bonds are
absent. Of course, if the holder were the only defendant and the court
obtained jurisdiction in personam over him, the issue would not arise.
The circumstances must be such that jurisdiction depends upon the
presence of a res. Analogous to the preceding situation, assumption of
jurisdiction would prove merely that the domicil of the holder is a proper,
although not necessarily the exclusive situs; whereas rejection of juris-
diction would demonstrate that the location of the bonds controlled, and
that the domicil of the holder is insufficient to give a court jurisdic-
tion. Gilnore v. Robillard substantially hits this situation.' There the
bonds and other securities were in New York. Complainant brought an
action in the federal district court in California, the niotnresident defend-
ant being served under the federal constructive service statute., The
district court sustained defendant's motion to quash. In the circuit court
of appeals complainant relied upon the doctrine that the situs of personal
property is at the domicil of the owner, and maintained that the domicil
of the testatrix, to whom the securities had belonged, was California."
In affirming the judgment the court stated that the doctrine advanced
by the complainant may be the rule where the question concerns taxation
or the assumption of probate jurisdiction,
"but a different principle applies where the jurisdiction of a court
over the persons of the defendants depends upon the fact that there
is a res within the jurisdiction which may be reduced to possession
by the court and disposed of by its judgment or decree." 12
Although the lone authority of Gilnore v. Robillard held that situs
depended upon the presence of the bonds; a study of the decisions in
which both elements, i.e., the bonds and the holder's domicil, are either
present or absent, is necessary to discover which of these two elements
will prevail to determine the basis of jurisdiction.
Actually, in three cases where suit was brought at the domicil of the
holder and the bonds were present, the courts assumed jurisdiction in
rem. 3 But in none of these cases did the courts attach any significance
to the domicil of the holder despite the fact that the holders appeared
9. 44 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
10. 36 STAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 118 (1927).
11. Although the owner of the legal title was really the executor, the case w.as argued
and decided upon the assumption that the domicil of the testatrix w,-as the domlcil of
the owner. Hence, the erroneous concept of ownership should be overloohed in evaluat-
ing the decision.
12. Gilmore v. Robillard, 44 F. (2d) 295, 296 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930).
13. Bede Steam Shipping Co. v. New York Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 6558 (S. D. N. Y.
1931) (United States certificates of indebtedness); First Trust Co. of St. Paul v.
Matheson, 187 'Minn. 46S, 246 N. W. 1 (1932); Laughlin v. Wells Bldg. Co., 169 11is.
50, 171 N. AW. 755 (1919). But cf. Cleveland National Bank v. Burroughs Land Co., 10
Ohio App. 61 (1917), which. is distinguishable.
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as plaintiffs. 4 On the contrary, the presence of the bonds was regarded
as the determining factor.
Where both the domicil of the holder and the bonds are outside the
state, the courts have refused to take jurisdiction in ren." With the
exception of two Pennsylvania decisions, the courts, in rejecting juris-
diction, emphasized the absence of the bonds rather than the nonresidence
of the holder.' Thus Pennsylvania stands in solitary grandeur upon
the other side of the fence.' But the earlier of the two Pennsylvania
cases should be treated sympathetically, because in 1876 the doctrine
mobilia sequuntur personam was still "riding high." Nevertheless, the
later case overlooked the modern concept of the bond itself as the res
rather than mere evidence of the res, and adhered to the remnants of
the aforementioned doctrine treating the debt as the res, the situs of
which followed the owner. Yet perhaps censure of the decision should
be softened by reason of the court's alternative ground that the relief
sought was in personam in any event.
Naturally most of the cases turn upon their own peculiar fact situa-
tions, but it seems safe to conclude that the situs of the bonds themselves
is the only situs for jurisdiction in ren over obligations evidenced by
bonds. The opinion in First Trust Company of St. Paul v. Ml1atheson'8
expressed the soundness of this view in the following language:
"Evidences of debt though they are, yet the property represented,
and all rights of ownership, so far inhere in the bonds that one in
mere possession of them ordinarily has and may transfer title to all
they represent as against the whole world . . .
"But when debtor and creditor create such a corporeal thing as
bearer bonds, they have created something upon which jurisdiction
of any kind may act. They have made more than mere symbol. They
have fabricated a matrix-like container for the property, wherein it
14. This is not entirely clear in the Bede case, but if the holder was not the plaintiff,
it was a trust company domiciled in the district.
15. See cases cited infra notes 16 and 17. Henderson v. Usher, 118 Fla. 688, 160
So. 9 (1935), is not contra, but reaches the opposite result by reason of the particular
facts in the case.
16. Chase v. Wetzlar, 225 U. S. 79 (1912); Von Hesse v. Mackaye, 55 Hun 365,
8 N. Y. Supp. 894 (1st Dep't 1890); Hodgens v. Columbia Trust Co., 185 App. Div.
555, 173 N. Y. Supp. 304 (1st Dep't 1918) (based on absence of the bonds and nature
of the relief demanded) ; Waverly v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 100 Ill. 354 (1881)
semnble; cf. McLaughlin v. McLaughlin Real Estate Co., 162 App. Div. 644, 147 N. Y.
Supp. 959 (2d Dep't 1914). Williams v. Fischlein, 144 App. Div. 244, 129 N. Y. Supp.
129 (2d Dep't 1911), contains a pronouncement that the debt, being upon a specialty,
namely, the bond, has its situs where the bond is. But then the court hedges by adding
that at least where the creditor's domicil and the bond are both outside the state, the
debt has no situs therein.
17. Huntzinger and Cake v. Philadelphia Coal Co., 11 Phila. 609 (Pa. C. P. 1876);
Gallagher v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 315, 185 Atl. 707 (1936).
18. 187 Minn. 468, 246 N. W. 1 (1932).
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is to be carried from place to place, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, at
the will of the possessor. Mere manual transfer of the container
transfers the property itself to new ownership. The property is so
sealed in the container that he who has it must have the contents.
In the practical sense, where the container is there also must be the
property."' 9
Even at common law, bonds were considered personal property. Trover
could be maintained for their conversion. They could be specifically
replevied. They were looked upon as part of the movable estate of a
deceased owner.2 0 How much more so should they be regarded today,
when many states have made them subject to attachment; and, of even
more importance, when the business community treats them as tangible
personal property.2 '
Bills, Notes and Chccks
With this background of the possible siti which might result from
the refusal of courts to look upon the bond itself as property, the next
question is to consider whether the courts regard the various forms of
commercial paper as tangible property merging the obligation which they
represent. If they do not, it is obvious that the case becomes one in-
volving a simple debt. Whether a simple debt is property, and, if so,
how to determine its situs, will be covered subsequently.2
From a logical standpoint, commercial paper, such as bills of exchange,
drafts, promissory notes, and checks, should be placed in the same category
with bonds; and its situs for jurisdiction in rem should depend upon the
situs of the instrument itself. Commercial paper is transferable in the
same manner as bonds and with the same effect: if bearer paper, it passes
by delivery; if order, by indorsement and delivery; if the instrument is
negotiable, it passes free from the so-called personal defenses; if non-
negotiable, it is subject to defenses. As in the case of a bond, most forms
of commercial paper are regarded by the business world as more than the
mere evidence of an indebtedness. The paper is looked upon as the em-
bodiment of the underlying obligation.
In attempting to discover whether the courts have endowed commercial
paper with a situs of its own, the authorities which have held or implied
the affirmative will be considered first. They may be divided into two
19. First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 187 Minn. 463, 473, 246 N. AN. 1, 3
(1932).
20. See Von Hesse v. Mackaye, 55 Hun 365, 36,, 8 N. Y. Supp. S94, 895 (1st
Dep't 1890).
21. See First Trust Co. of St. Paul v. Matheson, 187 Miinn. 468, 478, 246 N. IN. 1, 3
(1932). The cases do not indicate whether the bonds must be negotiable, although in
First Trust Co. v. Matlieson the court pointed out that unregistered bearer bonds vere
involved.
22. See p. 254 et seq. infra.
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categories: first, those in which the instrument was outside the juris-
diction; and secondly, those in which the instrument was within the
jurisdiction.
Decisions within the first of these classes are somewhat difficult to
appraise, because in all of them the defendant in possession of the notes
was a nonresident not subject to the court's personal jurisdiction. Under
such circumstances it is natural to find in the decisions the idea that the
want of jurisdiction is due to the absence of property and person. How-
ever, it seems fair to interpret these cases as holding or implying that if
either the person or the instrument were within the jurisdiction of the
court, it could hear the case. Jurisdiction over the nonresident holder
would justify the court in entering an order against him with reference
to the disposition of the instrument. Jurisdiction over the instrument
would permit a decree concerning rights or interests in it, so long as the
decree did not compel action upon the defendant's part. Although the
cases are not wholly satisfactory, there runs through them the notion
that absence of the paper prohibits jurisdiction in rein; and there is little
or no intimation that the situs of the res is at any place other than the
situs of the paper.23 But in effect the sum of all that the cases, in this
category, would say is merely that if the document were within the state
or district, the court would have jurisdiction. However, more positive
authority in favor of the separate situs principle is found in those decisions
which have upheld constructive service where the instrument was actually
within the jurisdiction; for several cases have directly held that com-
mercial paper constitutes property, the situs of which inheres in the paper,
and the presence of which authorized constructive service upon a non-
resident defendant. 4
23. Bank of Jasper v. First National Bank of Rome, 258 U. S. 112 (1922) ; Beach
v. Mosgrove, 16 Fed. 305 (C. C. D. Neb. 1883) (alternative ground of decision); Hauf
v. Wilson, 31 Fed. 384 (C. C. W. D. Tenn. 1887) (in which the court said, "He is not
here, nor the note") ; Pensacola State Bank v. Thornberry, 226 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. 6th,
1915) (intimation that situs is place where note is or where legal holder is, but perhaps
court meant that in latter situation jurisdiction would be in personam rather than in
ren) ; Gilmore v. Robillard, 44 F. (2d) 295 (C. C. A. 9th, 1930) (treating note in same
category as bond, without comment) ; Tigrett v. Taylor, 180 Ala. 296, 60 So. 858 (1912) ;
Ward v. Boyce, 152 N. Y. 191, 46 N. E. 180 (1897) (alternative ground of decision);
Hodgens v. Columbia Trust Co., 185 App. Div. 555, 173 N. Y. Supp. 304 (1st Dep't
1918).
24. Manning v. Berdan, 132 Fed. 382 (C. C. D. N. J. 1904); Jones v. Rutherford,
26 App. D. C. 114 (1905); Loaiza v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 85 Cal. 11, 24
Pac. 707 (1890); Doepke v. Christy Box Car Loader Co., 14 Ohio N. P. (N. s.) 523,
26 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 583 (C. P. 1913). Although in the Loaiza case the payee of the
notes was in California and personally served, he was merely the agent of the non-
resident defendants, and the court based its decision upon the presence of the notes.
Three cases rejecting jurisdiction despite the presence of the paper were decided upon
special grounds and are not contra to the rule. Crichton v. Wingfield, 258 U. S. 66 (1922)
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In the Manning case, for example, defendant's counsel argued that the
note was not personal property within the constructive service statute,
but was a mere written promise and evidence of a debt. To this conten-
tion the court replied that the promissory note was more than a mere
written promise; that it was a negotiable instrument, recognized by the
law merchant as property; that a transfer of the note operated as a
transfer of the debt; and that the note should be regarded the same as
a bond.
It is interesting to observe that the decisions holding that commercial
paper is property and possesses a situs of its own do not stress the neg,-
tiability of the instrument. In fact, in many of the cases cited,2" it is
not shown whether the instrument was negotiable or nonnegotiable; and
in those in which it does appear that the instrument was negotiable, the
court barely mentions the fact.
It is now appropriate to examine the authorities holding or leaning
toward the view that commercial paper is not property separate and apart
from the underlying obligation, and does not have a situs of its own.
In two of the cases in which the court rejected jurisdiction, the notes
were outside the state. This would render these cases consistent with the
view that the paper does have a separate situs, but for the fact that the
decision in one was upon the theory that a debt has its situs where the
creditor is,2" and that in the other, the Wilianson case, the court seemed
opposed to the idea that a note in itself is property. -7 However, in First
Trust Company of St. Paul v. Mathcson,2 which, as indicated above,
held that bonds have their own situs, the court distinguished the Wfilliam-
son case upon the ground that there no property was within the state.
Yet in two cases, notwithstanding the presence of the document, the
court rejected jurisdiction, partially at least, although somewhat vaguely,
because of the theory that the document has no separate situs.2
The most direct authority refusing to confer a separate situs upon
commercial paper is First National Bank of Broken Boz, v. Bank of
(notes brought into state wrongfully); Winnett Times Publishing Co. v. Berg, S Mont.
141, 265 Pac. 710 (1928) (action in personam); American Soda Fountain Co. v. Hair-
ston Drug Co., 52 S. 1V (2d) 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (action in perso:amn).
25. See cases cited supra notes 23, 24.
26. J. L. Cocke & Co. v. Brewer, 68 Miss. 775, 9 So. 8-3 (1891).
27. Williamson v. Falkenhagen, 178 Minn. 379. 217 N. W. 429 (1929). An investi-
gation of the decisions relied upon in that case leads to the opinion that the court meant
to decide the case upon the dual grounds that the action w.-as in personans and that a
debt evidenced by a note is a mere chose in action or personal chattel.
28. 187 Minn. 46S, 246 N. N. 1 (1932).
29. Larson v. Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 238 Mich. 36, 213 N. IV. 140
(1927) ; Warlick -. Reynolds, 151 N. C. 606, 66 S. E. 657 (1910) (counsel did not raise
proposition that presence of notes gives jurisdiction).
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Horatio.8" But there the certificates of deposit were nonnegotiable, and
the court stressed this feature in reaching its conclusion.,'
From a review of the authorities, the following conclusion may be
drawn: that generally negotiable instruments are regarded as property
apart from the obligations for which they are given, and that the docu-
ments themselves have a situs of their own after the manner of tangible
personalty. The underlying obligation becomes merged in the paper, and
is no longer a res, if indeed it ever was, with a situs of its own. As to
nonnegotiable paper the law is not so clear. Yet for the purpose of situs,
it should be treated the same as negotiable paper."2 The underlying
obligation is as completely merged in a nonnegotiable as in a negotiable
instrument. That a remote holder of the nonnegotiable instrument takes
subject to more defenses than does the holder of a negotiable instrument
is no argument in favor of nonmerger. A negotiable instrument, payable
to order, may be transferred without indorsement, in which case the
transferee takes subject to all defenses; but no one would contend that
this prevents the negotiable instrument from being a res separate and
apart from the underlying debt. The inferior position of the innocent
purchaser for value should not be held to differentiate the nonnegotiable
from the negotiable instrument so far as its status as a res is concerned.
Insurance Policies
Professor Beale, in his monumental work on Conflict of Laws, supplies
a proper starting point for this investigation. He states:
"Whether an insurance policy is to be treated as a chattel for
purposes of jurisdiction remains doubtful on the authorities."8 3
He cites on this proposition only one case ;4 and although the court's
language there leaves one in doubt as to the exact meaning intended,
30. 161 Ark. 259, 255 S. W. 881 (1923) (court permitted cancellation of assignment
of certificates of deposit, notwithstanding absence of certificates and assignee; treated
deposit as res). Accord: Standard Dredging Co. v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 96
Cal. App. 93, 273 Pac. 871 (1928). The latter case appears contra to the Loaiza case
cited supra note 24, unless the notes in the Loaiza case were negotiable. The Standard
Dredging Co. case does not refer to the Loaiza decision. Another possible distinction
arises from the fact that the so-called notes in the Standard Dredging Co. case were
subject to certain conditions, which, under familiar principles of bills and notes, would
prevent their being notes at all. This point, however, the court did not notice, treating
the instruments as nonnegotiable notes.
31. A dictum in Steger v. Shofner, 54 S. W. (2d) 1013, 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932),
to the effect that under the law of Texas promissory notes and checks have no situs
independent of the owner's domicil is weakened 'by the court's failure to cite a single
authority.
32. A contrary view, unsupported by argument, is expressed in (1929) 38 YALE
L. J. 394.
33. 1 BEALE, CoNfLicr OF LAWS (1935) 446.
34. Evans v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 58 Fed. 303 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1893).
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the opinion, taken as a whole, seems to indicate that the court does not
consider an insurance policy property in the sense of the constructive
service statute. But there are a number of other decisions at least touch-
ing the question. Whether they will dispel the doubt expressed by Pro-
fessor Beale remains" to be seen.
It has been held that jurisdiction in rem cannot be founded upon the
mere presence of an insurance policy." And although in several cases
the court at the place where the policy was located did assume jurisdiction,
a careful study of the opinions in these cases reveals that the presence
of the policy was not the controlling factor2 Two cases are of such
importance that they require detailed discussion.
In the Cameron case, the policy named the sisters of the insured as
beneficiaries. After the insured's death, his widow brought an action
in New Jersey to reform the policy, claiming that by mistake the bene-"
ficiary clause omitted a provision making the insured's wife the bene-
ficiary should she survive the insured. Plaintiff had possession of the
policy. There was jurisdiction in personam over the insurance company
and one sister. The other sister was served by publication. She appeared
specially, challenging the jurisdiction. The court denied her motion, and
ruled that the service by publication constituted due process, since the
proceeding was quasi in rem, and the policy, the res against which the
decree of reformation would become effective, was in the possession of
the complainant and within control of the court.
"Such a decree," continued the court, "as to this defendant, will
affect only the policy by determining its form and will not be dis-
positive of her claim thereunder." 38
This reasoning seems rather specious, because after the reformation
complainant would be the beneficiary and thus entitled to the proceeds of
the policy. In deciding to reform the policy, the court ipso facto must
have passed upon and decided adversely to the sister the facts constituting
the basis of her claim, namely, the intended contents of the beneficiary
35. Stockbridge v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 Fed. 558 (D. Conn. 1912)
(stating that the policies do not constitute property) ; Austin v. Royal League, 316 I1.
188, 147 N. E. 106 (1925). In Mahr v. Nonich Union Fire Ins. Society, 127 N. Y. 452,
28 N. E. 391 (1S91), counsel conceded the point.
36. Bank of Idana v. Illinois Life 'ins. Co., 135 Kan. 129, 9 P. (2d) 629 (1932);
Morgan v. Mfutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, R2 N. E. 438 (1907); Cutter %.
American Trust Co., 213 N. C. 686, 197 S. E. 542 (1938). Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
12 Ky. 799, 110 S. W. 265 (1908), an interpleader action, placed considerable emphasis
upon the presence of the policy, but is opposed to the general rule in interpleader cases.
See Chafee, Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 Y.ux L. J. 685, 714, n. 102.
37. Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S. W. 577 (1916) ; Cameron v. Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 24, 161 Atl. 55 (1932), petition to set aside decree and reliti-
gate question of jurisdiction denied, with opinion, 116 N. J. Eq. 311. 173 At]. 344 (1934).
38. Cameron v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 24, 26, 161 At. 55, 57
(1932).
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clause. Although possibly a second court, having jurisdiction in personam
of the sister, might hold that the first court lacked jurisdiction and that
its decree was therefore not entitled to full faith and credit and not res
judicata as to the facts determinative of the reformation, it is also possible
that the second court might decide, even though erroneously, that the first
court had jurisdiction. In this event the second court would render judg-
ment against the sister, and, since by hypothesis, it had jurisdiction, her
claim would be forever cut off.
An even more peculiar line of argument was advanced by the court in a
subsequent part of the opinion, namely, that if the contract was as alleged
in the bill, defendant had no rights under it, and, as a result, reformation
would not deprive her of any property without due process of law. Under
this fallacious theory a court would always have the right to decide the
Itontroversy on its merits, regardless of jurisdiction over the defendant.
Neither of the two reasons just given seems worthy of serious thought.
But another, and, indeed, the main ground for the decision, requires
closer study. The court, after saying that a proceeding to reform a
written instrument is usually in personam, added that actions to reform
deeds are held in rein or quasi in rein.
"Such actions may be in personam as to the parties to the con-
tract or instrument sought to be reformed; but as to third parties,
whose rights are incidental only, and depend upon what the contract
in fact is, not upon what it appears to be, the suit is quasi in rein.
It is possible for an action to be in personam as to one defendant
and quasi in rein as to another."0
The court then concluded that the principle in the case before it was
the same as in actions to quiet title to lands within the state.
With the general principle that an action to reform a contract is in
personam, no one will disagree.40 Nor is there any denying the correct-
ness of the proposition that actions to reform deeds and other conveyances
of land may be in rem. 41 But they are in rein not because the written
instrument itself is a res, but because it affects the interests of the parties
in the land, which is the res.
When the Cameron litigation arose a second time, on defendant's
petition to reopen the case, set aside the decree, and relitigate the ques-
tion of jurisdiction, defendant contended that at the time of the original
suit the policy was not in New Jersey, but was in possession of the in-
surance company in Pennsylvania. In refusing to reconsider the case,
the court called attention to a stipulation in the original suit, by which
counsel admitted the presence of the policy. In the opinion of the vice-
39. Cameron v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 24, 28, 161 Atl. 55, 57
(1932).




chancellor this stipulation precluded a rehearing. But he went on to
say that jurisdiction existed even in the absence of the policy, because
through control over the company and complainant, the policy could be
obtained. To use the vice-chancellor's words,
" . ..the test of jurisdiction is not the physical presence of the
policy itself within the borders of the state. If it is potentially within
the court's control, that is sufficient." -
This theory is inconsistent with the conception of an in rem or quasi in
rein proceeding, each of which requires that the property be within the
state.
In the second of these two cases, Perry v. Yotzig,a the insured as-
signed the policy to his mother, who later died. The distributees of the
mother's estate were then in the position of the mother so far as con-
cerned any right in the policy. The insured brought an action to reform
the assignment agreement by inserting a provision that, in the event of
his mother's prior death, the policy was to revert to him, He claimed
that this provision had been omitted from the assignment through over-
sight. Plaintiff brought the action because he wished to borrow on the
policy, and the company refused to accede to his request without the
consent of the distributees. The insurance company and some of the
distributees were subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court; but
one of the distributees was not so subject and was served by publication.
The court upheld the constructive service.
The fact situations in the Perry and Cameron cases should be com-
pared. In the Cameron case the action was to reform the policy, and thus
by no means could be considered as one directly affecting property; in
the Perry case the action sought to reform an assignnent of the policy.
Thus, if the policy be considered property, the case is parallel to an action
to reform a deed to real property, and the controversy concerns a dispute
over the ownership of the property itself. This is the perfect factual
situation for the determination of the question. Is the insurance policy
to be treated as property, the assignment of which constitutes a transfer
of property; or is it to be treated as a simple contract, the assignment
of which affects no property because nothing but the contractual rights
or liabilities are assigned?
The opinion of the court in the Perry case is not entirely satisfactory.
The court said that it had the insurance company before it, that it had
within its control the policy and the assignment on the back of it, and
"' . . the res itself, the claim against the insurance company
through having the latter company before it." 44
42. Cameron v. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., 111 N. J. Eq. 311, 314, 173 At. 344, 346
(1934).
43. 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S. WV. 577 (1916).
44. Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 525, 182 S. V. 577, 578 (1916).
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This would indicate that the court regarded the obligation of the company,
rather than the policy, as the res." However, the court goes on to state
that, although the policy is not actually in court, it may be obtained from
the plaintiff at any time.
"The court, thus having control of the res, can settle the status
and rights of the parties with respect to the insurance policy, although
one of the persons interested therein, under the assignment as it now
stands, is a nonresident, and made a defendant only by publica-
tion."46
Does this sentence mean that the policy, rather than the claim against
the insurance company, is the res? The answer would appear to be in
the negative; that, taken as a 'whole, although control of the policy is
necessary in order to reform it, the res is not the policy, but is the claim
against the insurance company.
Two judges, however, dissented, upon the ground that there was no
property or res in the state, and that the action was entirely personal.
Judge Fancher, one of the dissenters, argued that a policy of insurance
is not property, but is only evidence of an obligation, and that the obli-
gation itself "is like a thing in the air which may fly anywhere." 7
The Perry case has not enjoyed much popularity,48 and, because it
named the claim against the insurance company as the res, it cannot be
regarded as authority for the proposition that the policy is the res. Simi-
larly, Evans v. Charles Scribner's Sons4" contained language seemingly
against the concept of the insurance policy as a res. Other cases contain
similar language or language so ambiguous as to render it impossible for
use even as dictum."
45. Confusion is added by reason of the fact that no claim against the company
existed at the time, since the insured still lived.
46. Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 526, 182 S. W. 577, 578 (1916).
47. Perry v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 541, 182 S. W. 577, 582 (1916). To buttress his
position, Judge Fancher erroneously likened a policy of insurance to a note, which, as
we have already seen, is considered property, at least if negotiable.
48. Edwards v. New York Life Ins. Co., 173 Tenn. 102, 114 S. W. (2d) 808 (1938),
discusses Perry v. Young. And see Note L.R.A. 1917 B 393.
49. 58 Fed. 303 (C. C. N. D. Ga. 1893).
50. Vogel v. New York Life Ins. Co., 55 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U. S. 604 (1932) (situs of policies as choses in action said to be domicil of
debtor) ; McBride v. Garland, 89 N. J. Eq. 314, 104 Atl. 435 (1918) (inconclusive; dis-
tinguished in the Cameron case) ; Taylor v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 38 Misc. $75,
77 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1902) (wherein the court apparently overlooked the neces-
sity that any property be present) ; Gleason v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 203
N. Y. 507, 97 N. E. 35 (1911) (language ambiguous); Edwards v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 173 Tenn. 102, 114 S. W. (2d) 808 (1938) (inconclusive); Atlas Life Ins.
Co. v. Standfier, 86 S. W. (2d) 852 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (inconclusive); Riedel v.
Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 211 Wis. 149, 246 N. W. 569- (1933) (inconclusive).
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that a suit by an insurance company
to cancel a policy "did not concern any property, real or personal." New York Life Ins.
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But one thing seems certain regardless of the Camcron decision. Unless
the action concerns conflicting claims to the policy as property, con-
structive service should not be sufficient. Thus, actions to cancel or reform
the policy should be regarded as in personam. But where a situation
exists in which A and B each claims to own the policy, or in which
reformation of an assignment is sought, constructive service is permis-
sible if the policy be regarded as property. That it is so regarded is
certainly not settled. Until there is more definite authority treating an
insurance policy as a res, one is forced to the conclusion that it is placed
in the same category as an ordinary contract, which is not considered
a res for purposes of constructive service.5 '
Funds
The majority rule is that "funds" in the hands of administrators, -
trustees,5 3 or receivers 4 are regarded as property under constructive
service statutes. The same has been held of the proceeds of a special
tax levy."3 From a realistic point of view there is generally no actual
fund, in the sense of specific money, in the possession of the adminis-
trator or other fiduciary. Usually he has a bank account in his name as
administrator, and the so-called "fund" is nothing more or less than the
amount on deposit to his credit in the bank. Likewise, a bank or trust
company acting as trustee does not ordinarily hold any specific money
to represent the amount credited to the trust account. Yet to regard such
Co. v. Bangs, 103 U. S. 435 (1880). This is no authority on our point, however, because
the nature of the action was dearly not in rein.
51. See Steger v. Shofner, 54 S. V. (2d) 1013 (Tem. Civ. App. 1932); f. Iron Age
Publishing Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 83 Ala. 498, 3 So. 449 (1833); Law-
rence v. Times Printing Co., 90 Fed. 24 (C. C. D. Wash. IS9).
52. Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556 (1880) (lien on amount paid to administrator
in satisfaction of judgment) ; Castello v. Castello, 14 Fed. 207 (C. C. IV. D. Mo. 1832)
(removal of cloud on title to estate which has been converted into money).
53. Dahlgren v. Pierce, 263 Fed. 841 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920) (testamentary trust under
administration of court; accrued income) ; Spellman v. Sullivian, 43 F. (2d) 762 (S. D.
N. Y. 1930) (jurisdiction over trust company and trust corpus; surplus income);
Blauner v. Hirsch, 57 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932) (rental money paid to trustee
of lease); Standard Dredging Co. v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 96 Cal. App. 93, 273
Pac. 871 (1928) ("fund" deposited in trust company as collateral); see National Bank
of New Jersey v. White, 93 N. J. Eq. 109, 110, 115 Atl. 533, 534 (1921) ; cf. Bede Steam
Shipping Co. v. New York Trust Co., 54 F. (2d) 658 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); 'McMurray
v. Chase National Bank, 10 F. Supp. 960 (D. Wyo. 1935); Coyne v. Plume, 90 Conn.
293, 97 Ati. 337 (1916); Chappell v. Clarke, 94 11d. 178, 50 Atl. 527 (1901). Pollitz
v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 39 Fed. 707 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1889), also recognizes
the principle and holds that there is jurisdiction to enjoin a trustee from paying a sum
of money to a nonresident constructively served.
54. Brown v. Pegram, 143 Fed. 701 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1906) (removal of cloud on
title).
55. Continental Trust Co. v. Shunk Plow Co., 263 Fed. 873 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920).
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"funds" as a res is a convenient, useful, and not illogical fiction. Oddly
enough, the courts take the rule for granted, and no detailed discussion
of its basis has been found. Of course, one might put it upon the ground
that the estate and all its local assets, including bank accounts, are in
custodia legis. But this does not explain the federal cases, for in them
the estate is not in the custody of the federal court, but of the proper
state court. However, it is not unreasonable to take the position that an
estate under the supervision of the state court within a given county or
district has a local situs, and consequently that all local property belonging
to the estate, including bank accounts, is property within the county or
district.
Not all the cases, however, concern property under the supervision
of a court through an administrator, trustee, or the like. For instance,
in Blauner v. Hirsch6 a ninety-nine year lease was assigned to a trust
company as trustee, and nothing in the report indicates that the trust
was under judicial supervision. Regardless of this, and without men-
tioning it, the court held that the rentals paid into the trust company
constituted a res. In addition to pointing out that the rentals grew out
of real estate, the court states that, apart therefrom, the presence of the
trust company and the trust res sufficed to give the court authority to
determine the relative rights of parties in the trust res. It is worth noting
that the trust company in Blauner v. Hirsch was a New York company,
but it maintained a branch in Cleveland, and this branch handled the
trust which was the subject-matter of the suit. In all the cases cited there
was a localization of the res by reason of either judicial supervision over
the estate, trust, or receivership, or jurisdiction over the trustee, which
in itself was localized in that it was a bank or trust company, domiciled
or carrying on its business in the state or district. In the cases of the
latter type, the units comprising the trust, whether tangible or intangible,
were under local management.
Debts
Is a debt property of the sort required for constructive service? If
so, how does one determine its situs?
It is difficult to conceive of a debt as property in the ordinary sense
of the word. If A owes B a thousand dollars, may it be said that B owns
any specific property? If B assigns the claim to C, is B transferring to
56. 57 F. (2d) 114 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932). A similar situation was present in Standard
Dredging Co. v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 96 Cal. App. 93, 273 Pac. 871 (1928). In
Mutual Home Association v. Zwatchka, 297 S. W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927), the court
took the same position with reference to a deposit by the nonresident defendant in a local
bank, plaintiff claiming that the deposit was made to secure a note executed by the non-
resident. But query whether the court was correct. Perhaps the decision may be ap-
proved upon the basis that a special deposit should be considered a res.
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C an interest in any property? If there is a dispute as to the validity
of the assignment, is A, in suing B and making C a party, asking the
court to decide that B owns specific property; or is he asking the court
to decide that A owes the thousand dollars to B instead of to C?
To constitute property within the constructive service statutes the
res must be capable of having a situs. How can a debt have a situs?
A debt is merely an obligation upon the part of the debtor to pay the
given amount to the creditor upon the due date.
The problem is by no means simplified by other types of action wherein
the situs of a debt has been at issue. For example, for purposes of juris-
diction to tax, it has been held that debts have a situs at the domicil of
the creditor,"5 whereas for purposes of administration of an estate the
domicil of the debtor is the situs." Likewise, since Harris v. Bak, 9 a
debt may be garnished wherever plaintiff is able to get jurisdiction over
the debtor. Consistently with the garnishment cases, perhaps a debt
should be held a res, the situs of which travels with the debtor. Yet as
Professor Beale has said,"'
" . . . the notion that garnishment is an ordinary action against
the garnishee in combination with another personal action, an action
against the principal debtor, has led the courts gradually to decide
that garnishment proceedings will lie in any place in which personal
jurisdiction may be obtained over the garnishee. In short, the orig-
inal conception of garnishment as a proceeding based on jurisdiction
in rein over a thing has been entirely superseded by a conception of
garnishment as a transitory personal action against the garnishee."
That the garnishment cases have lost sight of the in rei nature of the
proceeding is no reason for duplicating the error in conflicting claim
cases, which by constitution and statute require the presence of property
within the jurisdiction. 2 Furthermore, consistency is not a sine qua no;l
in the development of the law, and in order to find the answer to the
immediate question, it will be more prudent to observe only the conflict-
ing claimant cases and let garnishment shuffle for itself. Besides. perhaps
consistency demands with equal logic that the conflicting claim situation
57. See Comments (1917) 30 HMRv. L. r'r. 436, (1926) 39 H~AR. L. RLv. 435,
maintaining that a debt is incorporeal and incapable of having a situs.
58. See 1 Br.ALE. loc. cit. supra note 4.
59. See Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654, 656 (18S4).
60. 198 U. S. 215 (1904).
61. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rein to Compel Payment of a Debt (1913)
27 H~Av. L. REv. 107, 118.
62. For a good statement of the essential difference between situs in garnishment and
situs in conflicting claim cases, see Von Hesse v. Mackaye, 55 Hun 365, 369. 8 N. Y.
Supp. 894, 896 (1st Dep't 1890). See also Bank of Jasrer v. First National Bank of
Rome, Georgia, 258 U. S. 112, 119 (1922).
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be decided in the same manner as the interpleader cases, the majority
of which do not permit constructive service.
3
In considering the authorities on this issue, i.e., whether or not a debt
is property in a suit brought by A, claiming that he is entitled to or has
an interest in the amount due, and seeking to bar B, a nonresident, from
some interest therein, it will be convenient to look first at the federal
cases. Two Supreme Court decisions must be scrutinized. The first, in
point of time, is Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Company. 4 Decedent's widow
brought an action in Tennessee, claiming that decedent was domiciled
there, by reason of which, under Tennessee law, complainant was entitled
to all the personalty. Among the assets was a claim against a Kentucky
corporation. If Kentucky was decedent's domicil, his mother would share
equally with his widow. The mother, a nonresident of Tennessee, was
served by publication. The Tennessee court held that Tennessee was
the domicil and, as a consequence, decreed that the widow owned all
the personal property. In a subsequent suit in Kentucky, the court refused
to give full faith and credit to the Tennessee decree so far as it affected
the claim against the Kentucky corporation. The Supreme Court upheld
the Kentucky court upon the theory that the Tennessee decree could have
no effect in rem upon the Kentucky assets. It might logically be deduced
from this holding that the Supreme Court meant that a debt is property
at the domicil of the debtor, and that an action to determine ownership
of the debt may properly be brought in that state. However, a study of
the opinion indicates that the court intended to hold only that, for purposes
of founding administration, simple contract debts are assets at the domicil
of the debtor. Such a limited holding would suffice to decide the case,
for if the debt constituted an asset of the estate in Kentucky, that state
alone would possess the power to determine its distribution. Indeed, if
such a limitation is not placed upon the decision, it conflicts with the
more recent opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Bank of Jasper v. First
National Bank of Rome, Georgia."'
63. See Chafee, Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 685. As Professor
Chafee points out at page 699 of his article, since a state would have jurisdiction over
a nonresident in interpleader actions relating to land or chattels, the reason for not allow-
ing interpleader in the debt cases must be that the courts do not regard a debt as prop-
erty. Apparently the Federal Interpleader Act, 49 STAT. 1096, 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (26)
(Supp. 1938), does not affect conflicting claimant actions brought under the constructive
service statute, 36 STAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 118 (1927); and Rules 4 (e) and
4 (f), FED. RULES CIv. PROC. (1938), merely enlarge the in personam territory of the
United States District Courts. Cf. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U. S.
518 (1916).
64. 242 U. S. 394 (1917).
65. 258 U. S. 112 (1922). Although technically dictum, Justice Brandeis' opinion
that an indebtedness on open account is not such property as to permit constructive ser-
vice is of great importance, since it appears to be the only pronouncement by the Supreme
Court on the exact point.
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Two district court cases, decided before either of the Supreme Court
cases just discussed, take the view that a general indebtedness is not a
res within the meaning of the constructive service statute." Directly
opposed to that view is a more recent decision of the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit,' 7 holding that constructive service is
authorized under the federal statute in an action involving conflicting
claims to a bank credit. Plaintiff claimed that the transfer of the credit
should be declared fraudulent and void and the amount thereof paid to
plaintiff. After commenting upon the position of one defrauded of his
property, the court said:
"Impliedly conceding, for sake of argument, all that has been said,
it is contended that the facts pleaded show only a paper transaction,
which did not create or bring under the court's jurisdiction any
personal property within the meaning of Section 118, that the section
contemplates some specific tangible thing, that here no money passed,
no particular fund was created, only book entries were made at
plaintiff's direction in the Omaha Branch bank, and there is no
res in the State and district of Nebraska which can be adjudged upon
and disposed of by the court. It would be hard to convince men who
devote their time to business and financial transactions that there is
any merit in the contention. As proof to the contrary, and as a
matter of common knowledge, the $60,000 will be handed over at
the Branch bank's counter on proper orders to him who is entitled
to it. In every practical and business sense the $60,000 is there, and
it is a sacrifice of substance to form to say it is not. For remedial
purposes on plaintiff's bill we think the situs of any property interest
in the transferred deposit was at Omaha."0 98
The court then concluded:
"Accepting the allegations as stating the true facts, we think the
$60,000 transferred to the credit of Wyoming National Bank in the
Omaha Branch bank was personal property within the court's juris-
diction, to which plaintiff asserted an equitable claim and title, and
in that respect the suit was one properly brought under Section
118."69
Oddly enough, the court cited the Bank of Jasper case, which, as
already indicated, contained a dictum to the opposite effect. The court
66. Stockbridge v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 Fed. 558 (D. Conn. 1912)
(claim against insurance company); Mfurphy v. Ford Motor Co., 241 Fed. 134 (S. D.
Ohio 1916).
67. Omaha National Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 26 F. (2d)
884 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), cert. denicd, 278 U. S. 615 (1928).
68. Omaha National Bank v. Federal Reserve -Bank of Kansas City, 26 F. (2d)
884, 887 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
69. Omaha National Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 26 F. (2d)
884, 889 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
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also cited Goodman v. Niblack,7° which dealt with money in the hands
of an administrator, a distinguishable situation. Unless an inherent differ-
ence exists between a debt due from a bank and a debt due from an
insurance company or some other kind of obligor, the Omaha National
Bank case must be classified as contrary to the earlier federal decisions.
The mere fact that the bank may ordinarily be sued in only one juris-
diction, whereas the insurance company or other debtor may often be
subject to suit in several places, is no reason for holding that what was
not property in the latter case underwent a metamorphosis in the former."
It must be acknowledged, then, that a difference of opinion exists among
the federal authorities and that the point is far from settled.
Likewise, the state courts have disagreed. A number of cases upheld
constructive service in actions relating to the ownership of a debt.2 In
70. 102 U. S. 556 (1880).
71. Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937),
reaches the same result as the Omaha National Bank case in a suit involving debts owing
by Missouri corporations. But the constructive service took place tinder the Missouri
statutes, so that theoretically, at least, the decision should be placed with the Missouri
cases. As to whether a claim against the United States has a situs at the seat of the
Government, see Vaughn v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1841) ; United States v. Gorcher-
ling, 185 U. S. 223 (1902); Roberts v. Consaul, 24 App. D. C. 551 (1905); Phillips v.
Noel Construction Co., 266 Fed. 603 (App. D. C. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U. S. 631
(1920); Mellon v. Jones, 51 F. (2d) 431 (App. D. C. 1931), cert. denied, Jones v.
Mellon, 284 U. S. 641 (1931).
72. First National Bank of Broken Bow v. Bank of Horatio, 161 Ark. 259, 255
S. W. 881 (1923) (bank deposit; court called it a fund; nonnegotiable notes involved,
but decision was without reference to them) ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Probasco, 29 Ind.
App. 109, 63 N. E. 255 (1902) (concerned ownership of stock, but court treated it as
debt, and held situs at domicil of "debtor" corporation); Ely v. Hartford Life Ins. Co.,
128 Ky. 799, 110 S. W. 265 (1908) (full faith and credit to Ohio judgment on con-
structive service on insurance company's cross-bill; based upon presence of policy and
presence of company) ; Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 8th,
1937) (involving Missouri constructive service statutes; debts of Missouri corpora-
tions); State ex reL. Richardson v. Mueller, 230 Mo. App. 962, 90 S. NV. (2d) 171
(1936) (attorney's lien on "moneys" due from insurance company); Taylor v. Security
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 38 Misc. 575, 77 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (Sup. Ct. 1902) (in which,
however, court seemed unaware of necessity of a res) ; Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 438 (1907) (equitable lien claim against amount due
on insurance policy; a confusing opinion) ; Oishei v. Pennsylvania R. R., 117 App. Div.
110, 102 N. Y. Supp. 368 (1st Dep't 1907), aff'd without opinion, 191 N. Y. 544, 85 N. E.
1113 (1908) (attorney's lien) ; McKennell v. Payne, 197 App. Div. 340, 189 N. Y. Supp.
7 (2d Dep't 1921) (attorney's lien; court said: "The controlling point is that the fund
upon which the lien is asserted appears in the eye of the law to be here, although in fact
we well know that it is not. This appears to be a case where the doctrine or con-
venience of a legal fiction still survives.") ; Kumor v. Scottish Union & N. Ins. Co., 47
Wyo. 174, 33 P. (2d) 916 (1934) (claim against fire insurance company; court held
"proceeds" of policy to be res; query whether presence of the insured property influenced
the court) ; cf. Clark v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 99 Mo. App. 687, 74 S. W.
412 (1903) (not a conflicting claimant case); State ex rel. Reid v. Barrett, 118 S. W.
[Vol. 49: 241
SITUS OF INTANGIBLES
states committed to this doctrine a collateral problem arises. Is the situs
of the debt limited to the domicil of the debtor, or does it embrace all
places where one may obtain personal jurisdiction over him? The latter
appears to be the law.73 All the cases cited involved foreign corporations
doing business in the state of suit. Under this rule a debt may have a
situs in a number of places at the same time, which, from a strictly
theoretical standpoint, seems illogical. From a practical standpoint, how-
ever, the situation is no worse than in any other case in which two or
more courts have concurrent jurisdiction. Suppose, for example, that
claimant A sues the debtor in state X, making nonresident claimant B
a party. Suppose that thereafter claimant B sues the debtor in state Y,
making nonresident claimant A a party. It is possible that the court in
state Y will stay the proceedings, but suppose it refuses to do so. If the
state X court renders judgment, this will bar further proceedings in
the state Y court, which, by hypothesis, deems a debt property endowed
with a migratory situs, and which, therefore, will give full faith and
credit to the judgment. Of course, if state Y happened to be among the
group holding that a debt is not a res, its court would dismiss the original
action and the presnt problem would not then arise. The only ticklish
situation would come about if the debtor were domiciled in state Y,
where the rule happened to be that a debt, although property, has no
situs, except at the domicil of the debtor. Under these circumstances,
state Y would refuse to give full faith and credit to the state X judgment,
and the only recourse would be to take the matter to the Supreme Court
of the United States for a decision on the jurisdictional question of
whether or not the debt constituted property with a situs in state X.
The difficulty referred to is not in itself sufficient to overthrow the rule
that the debt has a situs wherever the debtor is subject to personal juris-
diction. This is especially true, because among the courts holding that
a debt is property for purp6ses of constructive service there appears to be
no dissent from the above rule, in consequence of which the difficulty is
unlikely to arise.
(2d) 33 ('Mo. 1938) (confusing but probably based upon presence of land as res) ; Perry
v. Young, 133 Tenn. 522, 182 S. W. 577 (1915) (action to reform an insurance policy;
court said res -was claim against company; but no claim existed at time); Gibson v.
National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 294 S. IN. 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 19-7) (interpleader).
A distinction made by the court in Schoenholz v. New York Life Ins. Co., 197 App. Div.
91, 188 N. Y. Supp. 596 (1st Dep't 1921) seems unjustified.
73. State ex rcl. Richardson v. Mueller, 230 Mo. App. 962, 90 S. W. (2d) 171
(1936); 'Morgan v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 189 N. Y. 447, 82 N. E. 43S (1907) ;
Oishei v. Pennsylvania R. R., 117 App. Div. 110, 102 N. Y. Supp. 363 (1st Dep't 1907),
aff'd without opinion, 191 N. Y. 544, 85 N. E. 1113 (1903); Kumor v. Scottish Union &
N. Ins. Co., 47 Wyo. 174, 33 P. (2d) 916 (1934). Accord: Bush v. Missouri State Life
Ins. Co., 86 Okla. 182, 207 Pac. 317 (1922) (point not mentioned). But cf. Larson v.
Dubuque Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 238 Mich. 366, 213 N. NV. 140 (1927) (under particu-
lar facts no situs at place where foreign corporation does business).
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As already indicated, however, some states dissent from the whole
conception of a debt as property within the constructive service statutes.
1 4
The best statement of this school of thought is contained in the following
dictum from First Trust Company of St. Paul v. Matheson.
"A debt or mere right of action with nothing more is wholly
incorporeal, with no evidence or representative which can give it
habitation anywhere. As to such property . . . sovereign power
must proceed in personam simply because there is nothing to take
hold on for proceeding in rem or quasi in rem. Hence there can
be no jurisdiction to adjudge ownership save as there is jurisdiction
in personam over the persons who must be bound in order to settle
that issue."1 5
This theme, sometimes expressly, sometimes implicitly, pervades the
opinions in decisions denying jurisdiction."'
It is thus apparent that the courts are sharply divided upon the question
of a debt as property within the meaning of the constructive service
statutes. Arguments exist for both points of view. But from a practical
standpoint, fictionalizing a debt as property will result in a more speedy
and less cumbersome method of deciding a dispute if the obligor refuses
to pay, for it will necessitate only one lawsuit instead of two. Nor will
the nonresident actually suffer any greater hardship than in the case
of disputed claims to a negotiable instrument, in which, as we have seen,
74. Austin v. Royal League, 316 I11. 188, 147 N. E. 106 (1925) (alternative ground
of decision; insurance claim not a res) ; McBride v. Garland, 89 N. J. Eq. 314, 104 Atl.
435 (1918) (alternative ground of decision; insurance claim not a res); Redzina v.
Provident Institution for Savings in Jersey City, 96 N. J. Eq. 346, 125 Atl. 133 (1924)
(bank account) ; Gallagher v. Rogan, 322 Pa. 315, 185 Atl. 707 (1936) (statute required
presence of chattels or lands, but court based decision on point that bank deposit is not
property) ; cf. Williamson v. Falkenhagen, 178 Minn. 379, 227 N. W. 429 (1929) (action
to set aside assignment; debtor was not made party nor his residence given; although
note involved, court treated like simple debt); J. L. Cocke & Co. v. Brewer, 68 Miss.
775, 9 So. 823 (1891) (notes involved, but court treated like simple debt; debtor not
party to action, but was subject to court's jurisdiction); National Bank of N, J. v,
White, 93 N. J. Eq. 109, 115 Ati. 533 (1921) (interpleader case, but decided partly on
point that debt was not res). Each of the three cases last cited, although slightly dis-
tinguishable from those directly in point, reached the same result and took the point of
view that a debt is not property.
75. 187 Minn. 468, 474, 246 N. W. 1, 3 (1932).
76. Two Oklahoma cases confuse the law in that state. Bush v. Missouri State
Life Ins. Co., 86 Okla. 182, 207 Pac. 317 (1922); Royal Neighbors of America v.
Fletcher, 99 Okla. 297, 227 Pac. 426 (1924). In jurisdictions holding that a debt is not a
res, payment of the amount into court does not create a res. Vogel v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 55 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 604 (1932); cf.
Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N. Y. 326, 130 N. E. 566 (1921); Bush v. Missouri State Life
Ins. Co., 86 Okla. 182, 207 Pac. 317 (1922); Mutual Home Ass'n v. Zwatchka, 297
S. W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). Despite misleading language in their respective
opinions, neither of the last two cases is contra. See Chafee, Interstate Interpleader
(1924) 33 YALE L. J. 685, 710-711.
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the courts allow constructive service. On the other hand, if the obligor
is perfectly willing to pay the proper party, two suits will be unnecessary
in any event; and the plaintiff, if required to obtain personal jurisdiction
over the adverse claimant, will be no more prejudiced than in any other
action in personam.7
Putting practical considerations to one side, and treating the general
question of debts as property under constructive service statutes from a
theoretical angle, it is difficult to regard a debt as a chattel. In the nego-
tiable instrument case there is within the jurisdiction an actual document
which is said to embody and merge the underlying debt. But in the case
of the simple debt this is not true. It seems doubtful that the constructive
service statutes were meant to cover a situation where two people are
merely disputing the right to receive payment from a debtor. This is
carrying reification a bit too far.
Stock
The owner of stock in a corporation does not "own" the corporate
property or any part thereof. But he does have a right to an aliquot
share of the surplus profits, and upon the dissolution of the company
he becomes entitled to a share of the surplus assets, i.e., those left after
payment of the corporate debts.7 That his interest constitutes property
in the sense intended by the constructive service statutes is undoubtedly
recognized.7 9 It is equally well settled that shares of stock in a corporation
77. For example, if A wishes to set aside an assignment of a claim which he holds
against B, he may bring an action against the assignee wherever he is able to obtain
jurisdiction in personam, and the outcome of the suit will determine the person to who2m
the debt should be paid. However, if there are several claimants, who cannot be servcd
in the same jurisdiction, the rule that a debt is property within the scope of the ccn-
structive service statutes will save A the inconvenience and e.xpense of two or more
suits.
78. The matter is well stated in Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 546, 147 Pac. 722,
725 (1915); and in Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359, 36, 114 N. E. S41, 843 (1916).
Of course, the stockholder may have other "rights" in the company, such as the right
to vote, and, as said in Hook v. Hoffman, he has an interest or right in the management
of the company.
79. In some of the decisions it appeared that the statutes of the particular state
definitely classified corporate stock as personal property. Jellenik v., Huron Copper
Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1900) (Michigan statutes); Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining
Co., 274 Fed. 104 (D. Del. 1921); Thompson v. Terminal Shares, Inc., 89 F. (2d) 652
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937); Bouree ct al. v. Trust Francais Oil Co., 14 Del. Ch. 332, 17 Ad.
56 (1924); Amparo lning Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 Ad. 249
(1909). In People's Nat. Bank of Shelbyville v. Cleveland, 117 Ga. 903, 44 S. r. 2)
(1903) the Georgia statute provided that stock of corporations holding land was per-
sonalty. In the other decisions, cited in subsequent footnotes, the court stated or as-
sumed without question that stock is property for the purpose of allowing constructive
service. Language to the contrary in Jones v. Gould, 149 Fed. 153, 157 (C. C. A. 6th,
1906) may be disregarded. See also Comment (1917) 30 HAnv. L. Rv. 4S6, disap-
proving the rule.
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have a situs at the domicil of the corporation.Y0 Whether this situs is
exclusive and whether the adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
in many states has modified the rule will be considered subsequently.
Support for the "domicil" rule has been found in statutes"' or cor-
porate by-laws or regulations which provide that shares of stock are
80. Cases referring to the Uniform Stock Transfer Act are not included at this
point. Unless otherwise noted, the stock certificates were either stated to be outside the
jurisdiction or the facts warranted such an assumption. In any event, the court regarded
the location of the certificates as immaterial. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co.,
177 U. S. 1 (1900) (principal office and most of corporate property also within district;
not clear whether certificates issued, but court treated as though issued and outside state;
apparently stock transfer office outside state) ; Gideon v. Representative Securities Corp.,
232 Fed. 184 (S. D. N. Y. 1916) ; Hudson Navigation Co. v. Murray, 236 Fed. 419 (D.
N. J. 1916) (fact complainant wrongfully brought certificates into state immaterial, as
presence of certificates unnecessary for jurisdiction; service under New Jersey statutes) ;
Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co., 274 Fed. 104 (D. Del. 1921); Doherty v. McDowell,
276 Fed. 728 (D. Me. 1921) (corporation had no property in state and did no business
in state; annual meeting of stockholders held in state) ; Thompson v. Terminal Shares,
Inc., 89 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) (service under Missouri statutes); Hook v.
Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 147 Pac. 722 (1915); People ex rel. Edinburg State Bank and
Trust Co. v. District Court of the Fourteenth District, 97 Colo. 485, 50 P. (2d) 789
(1935) ; Patterson v. Farmington Street Ry., 76 Conn. 628, 57 Atl. 853 (1904) (certifi-
cates not issued) ; Bouree v. Trust Francais, 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 Atl. 56 (1924) ; Per-
rine v. Pennroad Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 368, 168 Atl. 196 (1933); People's Nat. Bank of
Shelbyville v. Cleveland, 117 Ga. 908, 44 S. E. 20 (1903); Hamil v. Flowers, 133 Ga.
216, 65 S. E. 961 (1909) (principal office also in state; certificate not issued); Fabrig
v. Milwaukee & Chicago Breweries, 113 Ill. App. 525 (1904) (location of certificate not
apparent, but probably outside state); Michigan Trust Co. v. Probasco, 29 Ind. App.
109, 63 N. E. 255 (1902) (treated stock as debt) ; Martel v. Block, 154 La. 863, 98 So.
398 (1923) ; Andrews v. Guayaquil & Q. Ry., 69 N. J. Eq. 211, 60 Atl. 568 (1905), aff'd
without opinion for reasons stated in opinion below, 71 N. J. Eq. 768, 71 Atl. 1133 (1906)
(place of certificate not apparent).; Sohege v. Singer Mfg. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 567, 68 Atl.
64 (1907); Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 Atd. 249
(1909); Gagnon v. Roberts, 131 Misc. 126, 226 N. Y. Supp. 385 (Sup. Ct. 1928), aff'd
without opinion, 224 App. Div. 723, 229 N. Y. Supp. 858 (1st Dep't 1928) ; Howard v.
Marlin-Rockwell Corp., 156 Misc. 358, 281 N. Y. Supp. 666 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (contest-
ing executors) ; LeRoy Sargent & Co. v. McHarg, 42 S. D. 307, 174 N. W. 742 (1919)
(fact corporation has no property in state immaterial) ; Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash. 72,
120 Pac. 1060 (1912) (contesting administrators). Accord: Baker v. Baker, Eccles &
Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917) (estate case; determination of domicil of decedent, and con-
sequent ownership of stock, by court other than that at domicil of corporation not en-
titled to full faith and credit); Clark v. O'Donnell, 68 Colo. 279, 187 Pac. 534 (1920)
(defendant appeared, but court also held situs of shares at domicil of corporation);
Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233, 1 N. E. 476 (1885) (defendant not heard from); Iron
City Savings Bank v. Isaacsen, 158 Va. 609, 164 S. E. 520 (1932) (foreign corporation;
certificates outside state; decision based on rule that situs is at domicil of corporation) ;
see State ex rel. Methodist Old People's Home v. Crawford, 159 Ore. 377, 389, 80 P.
(2d) 873, 878 (1938).
81. Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining Co., 274 Fed. 104 (D. Del. 1921); Bouree v.
Trust Francais, 14 Del. Ch. 332, 127 Atl. 56 (1924) ; Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., 19 Del.
Ch. 368, 168 Atl. 196 (1933).
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transferable only on the books of the company.' But this is not a very
firm base upon which to rest the rule, especially since the true owner of
the certificate may compel the corporation to make the transfer on its
books.8 3 Furthermore, the requirement that stock shall be transferable
only on the books of the company is intended chiefly for the protection
of the corporation, to enable it to ascertain its stockholders for purposes
of dividends, notices, and the like;84 and failure to comply with the
requirement does not affect the validity of a transfer as between the
parties to the transaction.' Another reason given by several courts as
a basis for the "domicil" rule is that statutes in the particular state permit
attachment or levy of execution on the stock. 0 Yet so many decisions
fail to mention the attachment analogy that it should not be considered
the sole or even the principal criterion.
87
Still another attempt to rationalize the fiction of situs was represented
in the Jellenik case where the court said:
".. . the interest represented by the shares is held by the
Company for the benefit of the true owner. As the habitation or
domicil of the Company is and must be in the State that created it,
the property represented by its certificates of stock may be deemed
to be held by the Company within the State whose creature it is,
whenever it is sought by suit to determine who is its real owner."8 3
Even giving due weight to the various theoretical reasons advanced
by the courts, they are not entirely convincing. Actually the stockholder's
interest in the corporation has no situs in the sense of location, and the
real reasons for pinning a situs onto it are more practical than legalistic.
This fact has been recognized in some of the decisions. For instance,
in a recent federal case the court said,
"In any event, the corporation's domicil is tile most logical place
in which to reach all those who are involved in disputes over the
82. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 ( 1900) ; Gideon v. Represen-
tative Securities Corp., 232 Fed. 184 (S. D. N. Y. 1916): Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz.
540, 147 Pac. 722 (1915); Patterson v. Farmington S. Ry., 76 Cont. 628, 57 At. 853
(1904); Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 At. 249 (1909);
Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash. 72, 120 Pac. 1060 (1912) (except as betmeen the parties to
the transfer).
83. See 12 FLTCHER, CORpORATIONS (1932) 446 et seq.
84. Id. at 303 et seq.; see ferritt v. American Steel-Barge Co., 79 Fed. 228, 235
(C. C. A. 8th, 1S97).
85. FLEcHER, op. cit. supra note 83, at 30 ct scq.
86. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1900); Doherty v. McDow-
ell, 276 Fed. 728 (D. Me. 1921); People's Nat. Bank of Shelbyville v. Cleveland, 117
Ga. 908, 44 S. E. 20 (1903); Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq.
555, 73 Atl. 249 (1909) ; Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841 (1916).
87. For an unusual case, see Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq.
555, 73 Atl. 249 (1909).
88. 177 U. S. 1, 13 (1900).
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title or disposition of stock of the corporation, and it is not strain-
ing the legal fiction to say that, for such purposes, the stock con-
stitutes a res in that place."8' 9
Even more realistically, it has been stated"0 that stock should be given
a situs at the place where the courts can most effectively deal with it."
Several courts, in holding that the situs of stock is the domicil of the
corporation, state that the certificates constitute mere evidence of the
stockholder's property interest and are not in themselves the property. "
In view of this it is rather surprising to find a unanimous array of
decisions upholding jurisdiction at the place where the certificate is
located. The opinion in Merritt v. American Steel-Barge Company"
reflects the general theory behind these decisions:
"Speaking technically, it is true that a stock certificate is written
evidence of a certain interest in corporate property. The same may
be said of notes and bills. They are simply evidence of indebtedness
on the part of the individuals or corporations who issue them. But
in the business world such obligations or securities are treated as
something more than mere muniments of title. They are daily bought
and sold like ordinary chattels, they may be hypothecated or pledged,
they have an inherent market value, and, while differing in some
respects from chattels, they are generally classified as personal prop-
erty."9 5
89. McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 13 F. Supp. 53, 60 (D. Md. 1935).
90. 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 558, 73 At. 249, 250 (1909).
91. The same thought is expressed in Comment (1933) 21 ILL. BAR J. No. 6, at
16-17.
92. Jellenik v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 177 U. S. 1 (1900) ; Hudson Navigation
Co. v. Murray, 236 Fed. 419 (D. N. J. 1916); Hook v. Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 147 Pac.
722 (1915) ; People ex rel. Edinburg State Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Four-
teenth District, 97 Colo. 485, 50 P. (2d) 789 (1935) ; Michigan Trust Co. v. Probasco, 29
Ind. App. 109, 63 N. E. 255 (1902) ; AmparoL Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J.
Eq. 555, 73 Atl. 249 (1909) ; Gamble v. Dawson, 67 Wash. 72, 120 Pac. 1060 (1912).
93. Merritt v. American Steel-Barge Co., 79 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897); Ryan
v. Seaboard & R. R. R., 83 Fed. 889 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1897) (place of incorporation not
stated) ; Blake v. Foreman Bros. Banking Co., 218 Fed. 264 (N. D. Ill. 1914) ; Beal v.
Carpenter, 235 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); Clayton v. Smith, 131 Md. 562, 102 Atd.
925 (1917) (nonresident also demurred for want of equity, but court did not indicate
that this constituted appearance; place of incorporation not stated). Accord: Franz v.
Buder, 11 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), cert. denicd, 273 U. S. 756 (1927) ; cf.
Vidal v. South American Securities Co., 276 Fed. 855 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) (certificate
plus principal place of business and transfer office) ; Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F. (2d) 355
(C. C. A. 2d, 1926) (place of certificates plus office for stock transfers, directors' meet-
ings, etc.; follows Vidal case). Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394 (1917) is
not contra.
94. 79 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897).
95. Id. at 235. It is amusing to note that in Ryan v. Seaboard & R. R. R., 83 Fed.
889 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1897), the court kept out of trouble by announcing, "A press of
engagements prevents an extended discussion of this matter."
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Likewise, the court in Beal v. Carpenter0 asserted that shares of
stock in a corporation are not only evidences of interests in the property
of the corporation, "but representatives of those interests having a situs
wherever they are present to such an extent that they are property of
value which will sustain the jurisdiction of a court to decree the sale
and transfer of both the certificates and the interests they represent by
its judgment or decree founded on substituted service."
Are the cases holding that the presence of the certificate creates a
situs contra to those supporting the "domicil" view? Undoubtedly they
are not. It will be recalled that all but one of them were decided by federal
courts, and practically all of them concerned the federal constructive
service statute. That being true, the Jellenik case, a Supreme Court
decision, controls. That case upheld the domicil as a proper situs. It
cannot be assumed that later decisions of the lower federal courts were
intended to overthrow a Supreme Court decision. Nor is such an as-'
sumption necessary. The Jellenik case did not limit jurisdiction to the
domicil of the corporation. As remarked in Franiz v. Buder:
"It (the Jellenik case) did not hold that it might not also be
brought within the jurisdiction where the certificates were held,
where the purpose was to test the ownership of such certificates." 91
The dual situs was also expressly recognized in two of the other federal
cases.
98
A possible ground of distinction is suggested by the quotation above
from Franz v. Buder. Is it possible that the situs is limited to the place
of the certificate in cases testing the ownership of the certificate and to
the domicil of the corporation in other cases?" A laborious investigation
of all the cases previously cited - both those upholding the situs at the
domicil and those upholding it at the locus of the certificate - brings to
light an almost entire absence of discussion on the matter. Outside of
Hook '. Hoffman,00 which mentions that the certificate may have a
separate situs of its own for certain purposes, such as replevin, and
Franz v. Buder, already referred to, the only case seemingly concerned
with the question is Gallagher v. Roganz.20 In refusing jurisdiction at
the principal place of business, the holder of the certificate being a non-
96. 235 Fed. 273, 274 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
97. 11 F. (2d) 854, 859 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 756 (1927).
98. Vidal v. South American Securities Co., 276 Fed. 855 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921);
Norrie v. Lohnan, 16 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926).
99. A variation of this idea appears in Comment (1917) 30 HMv. L Rmy. 426.
100. 16 Ariz. 540, 147 Pac. 722 (1915).
101. 322 Pa. 315, 185 Ad. 707 (1936). The court merged the situs of the certificates
into the domicil of the owner, which is not the law, but that does not destroy the case as
authority on the point now under discussion. Nor does the fact that this was an inter-
county rather than an interstate case make any difference, because constructive service
was made pursuant to a statute requiring that there be property in the county.
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resident of the county, the court distinguished the matter before it from
the situation in the Jellenik case. In the Jellenik case the directors of
the company caused a fraudulent sale of the plaintiff's stock and bought
it in themselves. Plaintiff sued to remove a cloud on the title to his
stock. There was no contest over the ownership of any particular cer-
tificate. In Gallagher v. Rogan, on the other hand, plaintiff brought suit
to set aside a transfer of the stock as represented by the certificate, upon
the ground that the transfer was procured by fraud and undue influence.
With the exception of the Gallagher case, however, the courts have upheld
jurisdiction at the domicil of the corporation, even though the action
concerned a contest over the shares represented by a particular certificate,
to which plaintiff claimed ownership or some right, legal or equitable,' "0
They consider the presence of the certificate unnecessary, because, the
corporation being before them, they have the power to order a transfer
on the corporate books and a cancellation of the outstanding certificate.
The decisions allowing jurisdiction in rein at the locale of the cer-
tificate 10 3 relate for the most part to dealings concerning the certificate
or the shares represented by a particular certificate. Three of them were
actions to foreclose liens on the stock, which had been pledged to the
plaintiff.'0 ' Another was treated by the court as though solely an action
to obtain a certain designated certificate, although actually plaintiff asked
that all reissues of new certificates for the shares named be declared
void.' 5 In Clayton v. Smith' °6 plaintiff sought an order releasing thirty
of eighty shares held by a bank as security for a loan. Under the circum-
stances of the case the suit may properly be said to have concerned an
interest in certain shares and the certificate evidencing them.107
Thus far, the result of the decisions appears to be that actions in rent
concerning rights in a particular certificate may be brought at either the
domicil of the corporation or the place where the certificate is located.108
102. Gideon v. Representative Securities Corp., 232 Fed. 184 (S. D. N. Y. 1916);
Doherty v. McDowell, 276 Fed. 728 (D. Me. 1921) ; People's Nat. Bank of Shelbyville
v. Cleveland, 117 Ga. 908, 44 S. E. 20 (1903) ; Hamil v. Flowers, 133 Ga. 216, 65 S. E.
961 (1909); Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co., 75 N. J. Eq. 555, 73 At. 249
(1909); Holmes v. Camp, 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841 (1916).
103. See note 93 supra.
104. Merritt v. American Steel-Barge Co., 79 Fed. 228 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897) ; Blake
v. Foreman Bros. Banking Co., 218 Fed. 264 (N. D. Ill. 1914) ; Beal v. Carpenter, 235
Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
105. Ryan v. Seaboard & R. R. R., 83 Fed. 889 (C. C. E. D. Va. 1897).
106. 131 Md. 562, 102 Atl. 925 (1917).
107. Although Franz v. Buder, 11 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926), cert. denied,
273 U. S. 756 (1927) dealt with an action to quiet title to plaintiff's interest in stock
held in trust, the court seemed to deal with the situation as though it involved a contest
over the ownership of a certificate. The trust res theory would appear to be a better
basis.
108. Even though plaintiff does not claim ownership of or an interest in the particular




As to possible siti other than the domicil of the corporation and the
place of the certificate, three decisions should be noted.""0
In Wait v. Kern River Mining, Milling & Developing Conpa ny,"
the following combination of factors led the court to authorize construc-
tive service, although the company was a foreign corporation: (1) cor-
poration organized for sole purpose of doing business in California; (2)
all its property in California; (3) all its business transacted in California;
(4) its office in California. The court based its decision upon the point
that, in substance, the corporation was a domestic one.
Smith v. Pilot Mining Company"' upheld constructive service under
the following combination of facts: (1) no office in state of incorpora-
tion; (2) could not be served with summons in state of incorporation;
(3) all business done in Missouri; (4) stock books in Missouri; (5) all
corporate meetings held in Missouri.
The court reached the opposite result in Iron City Savings Bank ,.
Isaacsen." The combination of factors there, however, was weaker,
consisting only of principal office, plus records and books. The court
actually based its decisions upon the ground that, since the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, a situs no longer exists at the domicil in the absence
of seizure of the certificate or a valid injunction against its transfer.""
But the court stated that, even without the Act, no jurisdiction would
exist under the facts given.
There is no doubt of the correctness of the Wfait and Smith cases.
Any other ruling would have been absurd. But the situation in the Iron
City Savings Bank case might give rise to heated argument were it to
occur again. If the principal office, housing the tranfer books, is within
the state or district, and the court has obtained personal service on the
corporation, it seems rather foolish to reject jurisdiction upon the tech-
nical ground that the domicil is elsewhere.1
4
The effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act upon the law of situs
of stock in actions to settle conflicting claims will now be considered.
109. In Vidal v. South American Securities Co., 276 Fed. 855 (C. C A. 2d, 1921),
the combination of the certificate plus the principal office, containing the transfer boos!,
was present; and in Norrie v. Lohman, 16 F. (2d) 355 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) the com-
bination of the certificates plus an office for stock transfers, directors' meetings, and the
like sufficed. In the Vidal case the court stressed the principal office rather than the pres-
ence of the certificates. The Norrie case seemed to treat them as about equal in impor-
tance, but since it expressly followed the Vidal case, perhaps the court meant to emphasize
the presence of the office. The Vidal decision recognized the "domicil" rule, but did not
treat it as exclusive.
110. 157 Cal. 16, 106 Pac. 98 (1909).
111. 47 Mo. App. 409 (1891).
112. 158 Va. 609, 164 S. E. 520 (1932).
113. UNnFon_- STocic TRANSFER AcT § 13.
114. As will be shown later, however, the absence of the certificate justifies the deci-
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In the first place, before adoption of the Act, the existence of an
outstanding certificate outside the state of domicil did not prevent the
courts from taking jurisdiction on constructive service."" In at least
three of the cases the court expressly stated that the quasi-negotiable
quality of the stock certificate, with the resulting possibility of its transfer
to an innocent purchaser for value, was not a deterrent to the assumption
of jurisdiction." 6 Presumably the other courts were aware of the same
possibility. Not one of these courts, however, definitely expressed any
view as to the priority between the plaintiff, to whiom the stock might
be awarded by the decree of the court, and a subsequent innocent pur-
chaser of the certificate for value. Yet it seems that this is a matter of
paramount importance. If the law of the particular state protects the
innocent purchaser for value of the certificate against the plaintiff, the
assumption of jurisdiction is an empty gesture. But if the true basis for
jurisdiction in rem is a matter of practicality, would it not be advisable
for the court at the domicil to refuse jurisdiction if a certificate is out-
standing?" 7 However that may be, the specter of an innocent purchaser
for value lurking in the rnise en scone in no way frightened the courts
away from taking jurisdiction. What is there in the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act to make them change their tune? Before the Act, cer-
tificates of stock possessed a certain degree of negotiability. For example,
"one who had clothed another with the indicia of ownership was estopped
to assert his ownership against a bona fide purchaser for value."118 Never-
theless, the courts held the domicil of the corporation a proper situs of
the stock. What does the Uniform Act contain which warrants one in
saying that it changes the law in this respect? True, it increases the
number of situations in which a bona fide purchaser for value is entitled
to protection, but that effects no essential change so far as the instant
problem is concerned. It merely increases the number of lurking specters.
Does Section 13 of the Act affect the problem? It prohibits attach-
ment or levy upon shares of stock for which a certificate is outstanding
until the certificate is seized by the officer making the attachment or levy,
115. The cases cited supra note 102 are in point on this problem. Also, Hook v.
Hoffman, 16 Ariz. 540, 147 Pac. 722 (1915); cf. Patterson v. Farmington Street Ry.,
76 Conn. 628, 57 At. 853 (1904).
116. Hook v. Hoffman, supra note 115; Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co.;
and Holmes v. Camp, supra note 102.
117. The question of priority between the person to whom the court decrees the owner-
ship of the stock and the innocent purchaser for value of the certificate need not be set-
tled here, if, indeed, it can be. Cook treats the situation as analogous to that of a cred-
itor levying an attachment on defendant's stock at the domicil of the corporation, and
thereafter the defendant, a nonresident, transfers his certificate to an innocent purchaser
for value. His claim is that the attaching creditor prevails. 2 CooK, CoRORATIONs (8th
ed. 1923) 1335, 1609. But evidently this is not true in all states. See Commissioners'
Note to Section 13, UNIFORM STocK TRANSFER AcT.
118. Pomerance, The "Situs" of Stock (1932) 17 CORN. L. Q. 43, 49.
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or is surrendered to the corporation, or its transfer by the holder is
enjoined. So far as attachment and levy of execution are concerned,
the section terminates the danger of transfer to an innocent purchaser
for value, and eliminates the domicil as a basis for situs in attachment
and execution. Of course, it must be admitted that the danger of transfer
is not entirely excluded, for in a case where jurisdiction is obtained by
injunction, rather than by control over the certificate, defendant may
yet transfer to an innocent purchaser for value. Presumably, however,
his liability to contempt proceedings will prevent his taking any such
rash step.
Is Section 13 broad enough to include cases of conflicting claimants?
In words it deals only with attacunent and levy. Admittedly, the same
difficulty is involved; namely, transfer to an innocent purchaser for value.
But is it accurate to hold that, because Section 13 has remedied the defect
with relation to attachment, it has done so with relation to conflicting
claimant cases not even mentioned in the section? Perhaps one may argue
that the last sentence of the section does the trick. That sentence reads:
"Except where a certificate is lost or destroyed, such corporation
shall not be compelled to issue a new certificate for the stock until
the old certificate is surrendered to it."
Considered apart from the context, this sentence might readily be
interpreted as including a conflicting claimant case. If so interpreted,
it would probably result in the court's refusal to assume jurisdiction unless
it could get hold of the certificate, for under the statutory provision the
court would have no right to order the issuance of a new certificate to
the plaintiff, and a decree of ownership would produce a rather hollow
victory. Possibly, however, the sentence should not be torn from its
surroundings and should be interpreted as applying to attachment and
execution cases only."19
Is Section 1 of assistance? That section provides that title to a certifi-
cate and to the shares represented thereby can be transferred only by
delivery and indorsement of the certificate, or by delivery of the certificate
and a separate assignment or power of attorney. It states further that
its provisions shall apply, although the charter, articles of incorporation,
regulations, or by-laws provide for transferability only on the books of
the corporation.
This raises a more difficult situation than Section 13. In reciting that
certain methods of transfer shall be the only ones, does it intend to deprive
the courts of their hitherto exercised right to order the corporation to
make a transfer on its books? Is it not more accurate to hold that the
section refers only to voluntary transfers, not to transfers ordered by
119. But see Comment (1935) 45 Ytax L. J. 379, expressing the view that Section
13 should be regarded as divesting the domicil of the corporation of jurisdiction to deter-
mine ownership of stock.
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a court? Yet the trouble with this view is that the section is not limited
to transfer of title to a certificate, but includes transfer of title "to the
shares represented thereby." If the intangible interest of the shareholder
cannot be transferred, except by delivery of the certificate (with the addi-
tional requirements named in the section), would it not behoove a court
at the domicil of the corporation to say, "I have no jurisdiction to order
a transfer of the certificate, because the certificate and its holder are
outside the jurisdiction. Since 1'have no right to order a transfer of the
certificate, I have no right to order the corporation to transfer the shares
on its books, for Section 1 of the Uniform Act tells me that title to the
shares passes only with title to the certificate ?"
The Commissioners' Note to Section 1 declares that the fundamental
purpose of the whole Act is to constitute the certificate the representative
of the shares. This should lead courts to interpret the Act accordingly.
In the particular problem posed, which is not specifically dealt with by
Section 1, the Commissioners' Note should influence courts to abrogate
the rule that stock has a situs at the domicil, in cases where a certificate
is outstanding and neither the certificate nor the holder is subject to the
court's jurisdiction; provided, of course, that the action is one in which
transfer of the certificate might nullify the decree.
Section 8 is the final one pertinent to this problem:
"Although the transfer of a certificate or of shares represented
thereby has been rescinded or set aside, nevertheless, if the trans-
feree has possession of the certificate or of a new certificate repre-
senting part or the whole of the same shares of stock, a subsequent
transfer of such certificate by the transferee, mediately or immedi-
ately, to a purchaser for value in good faith, without notice of any
facts making the transfer wrongful, shall give such purchaser an
indefeasible right to the certificate and the shares represented
thereby."
Now, who would have power to set aside a transfer except a court?
Does the section, then, intend to give a court at the domicil of the cor-
poration jurisdiction to set aside the transfer despite the existence out
of the state of an outstanding certificate? Presumably not. Apparently
the section means to make clear that the innocent purchaser for value
takes priority over the plaintiff in the action to set aside the transfer. It
neither confers nor takes away jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in line with
the argument previously advanced, the section furnishes a court at the
domicil with a good reason for refusing to take jurisdiction; for by its
terms it renders a decree awarding title to the plaintiff potentially in-
effective, to say nothing of the possible prejudice to the corporation
resulting from such a decree.
It is to be concluded, then, that by reason of Section 1, taken in con-
nection with the Commissioners' Note thereto; of Section 8 and its effect
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upon a decree awarding ownership; and, possibly, of the last sentence
of Section 13, the courts should hold that under the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act stock no longer has a situs based upon the domicil of the
corporation in any action dealing with conflicting claims of ownership
of a particular certificate or the shares represented thereby, or in any
other action in which the transfer of an absent certificate to an innocent
purchaser for value would nullify the. decree. Technically, Section 8,
taken alone, does not change the law in a state which previously gave
priority to the innocent purchaser for value; but, as pointed out, the law
respecting priority was not clearly defined, and Section 8 forcefully
reminds a domiciliary court of the futility of taking jurisdiction under
the circumstances.1 0
How stand the cases on the question? The language in some of the
decisions would lead one to believe that the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act has not altered the "domicil-situs" rule in conflicting claim cases. 12 1
The cases cited apparently adhered to the rule, as did Mcuillcn v.
National Cash Register Company,"'2 in which the court refused to qualify
the fellenik decision, despite the adoption of the Uniform Act, in the
absence of a Supreme Court decision so requiring. But in two of the
three cases no question of title was involved.' On the other hand,
a Virginia case of comparatively recent vintage holds that in an action
to set aside a transfer of stock as fraudulent, the situs under the Uniform
Act is where the certificate is situated, and not at the domicil of the
corporation." 4 This decision represents the better view and doubtless
will be followed in the future.
120. Of course, even if the certificate were present, the court would have no juris-
diction to order an absent holder to transfer it, but an order for surrender and cancella-
tion would seem both proper and effective. Armed with such an order and in possession
of the surrendered certificate, plaintiff should be able to compel the corporation to issue
a new certificate to him.
121. See Harvey v. Harvey, 290 Fed. 653, 659 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923); Shinkle v. Dal-
ton Adding M6fachine Co. of Ohio, 19 Ohio N. P. (N.s.) 104, 103, 26 Ohio Dec. (:;..)
588, 591 (C. P. 1916).
122. 13 F. Supp. 53 (D. Md. 1935).
123. The Harzev and Shzinkle cases, supra note 121, concerned voting rights. The
McQuillen case, supra note 122, concerned an action to cancel certain stock alleged to
have been illegally issued to the defendants. The plaintiffs claimed that the allegedly
illegal issue constituted a cloud on the title to their own stock. Although the opinion is
not entirely clear, the case is probably contra to the interpretation advanced here of the
effect of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
124. Iron City Savings Bank v. Isaacsen, 158 Va. 609, 164 S. E. 520 (1932). A fed-
eral case, Klein v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 7 F. (2d) 769 (D. N. J. 1924), took the same
view in an action for the appointment of a receiver, holding that ovnership of stock in
a domestic corporation did not constitute "property" in the state, the certificates being
outside. Although the case did not involve a dispute concerning title, there was a certifi-
cate in existence and away from the jurisdiction of the court, and it might have been
transferred to a bona fide purchaser for value.
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Conclusion
In the foregoing study an attempt has been made to discover whether
various forms of intangibles are treated as property for the purpose of
validating constructive service in actions in rem against nonresident
claimants; and to determine the situs of those forms of intangibles so
treated. From the authorities examined, certain general conclusions are
warranted.1
2 5
1. The following types of intangibles are regarded as property in the
required sense:
a. Bonds;
b. Bills, notes and checks (at least if negotiable)
c. "Funds" in the possession of administrators, executors, trustees
or receivers;
d. Shares of stock.
2. Insurance policies are not property in the required sense.
3. The authorities are not in agreement as to whether debts come
within the term "property" as used in constructive service statutes. The
view that they do not seems more in accord with the purpose and policy
of such statutes.
4. Of the intangibles regarded as property, the situs of bonds and
of negotiable bills, notes, and checks 1 26 is governed by the law relating to
the situs of chattels. In other words, these instruments are considered
property separate and apart from the obligations which they represent.
5. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act shares
of stock apparently had a situs at either the domicil of the corporation
or the locale of the stock certificate. In most states controlled by the
Uniform Act the law is not yet settled. The courts of such states should
hold that in actions relating to conflicting claims of ownership in a par-
ticular certificate or the shares represented thereby, the sole situs is at
the location of the certificate. In other actions the pre-existent rules will
apply.
6. In jurisdictions embracing debts within the term "property," the
situs of a debt is not limited to the domicil of the debtor, but includes any
place where jurisdiction in personam may be obtained over him.
7. The cases dealing with "funds" have not presented any difficulty
with reference to situs. In most of them the fiduciary and the estate were
under the supervision of a local court, and in the others both the fiduciary
125. This summary is not intended to be exhaustive. Its purpose is to present in
abbreviated form the more important conclusions arrived at. Exceptions and modifica-
tions are not repeated here.
126. Although none of the cases cited concerned checks, it seems logical to classify
them with bills and notes.
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* and the depositary were within the jurisdiction. The interesting situation
of a fiduciary whose funds are deposited outside the state has apparently
not come to the attention of the courts. Doubtless in the case of estates
in process of administration in a particular county or district, funds under
the supervision of the appropriate court will be held to have a situs therein
regardless of the place of their deposit or the domicil of the fiduciary.
But where trust funds are not in the control of a court, a nice question
of situs may arise as between the domicil of the fiduciary and the place
where the account is deposited.
